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A Gestalt Theory Approach to
Structure in Language
Hans Buffart1* and Haike Jacobs2*
1 Retired, Krefeld, Germany, 2 Centre for Language Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
The fact that human language is highly structured and that, moreover, the way it is
structured shows striking similarities in the world’s languages has been addressed from
two different perspectives. The first, and more traditional, generative hypothesis is that
the similarities are due to an innate language faculty. There is an inborn ‘grammar’
with universal principles that manifest themselves in each language and cross-linguistic
variation arises due to a different parameter setting of universal principles. A second
perspective is that there is no inborn, innate language faculty, but that instead structure
emerges from language usage. This paper purports to develop and illustrate a third
perspective, according to which the structural similarities in human languages are the
result of the way the cognitive system works in perception. The essential claim is that
structural properties follow from the limitations of human cognition in focus.
Keywords: human cognition, the magical number, universal grammar, usage-based grammar, syntactic
embeddedness, phonological structure, consonant shift, dissimilation
INTRODUCTION
The paper is structured as follows. In section “Structure in Language,” we will concentrate on the
fact that human language is highly structured. This section will be more useful for readers who
have no linguistic background than for those readers who are familiar with linguistics. In section
“Toward a Gestalt-like approach to structure in language,” we will review the essential elements
of this third perspective. This model fits within the so-called Gestalt psychology and emphasizes
that it is the observer who creates the experienced structures when, as a subject, she operates on
the environment. The cognitive system is described as a set of operations on its environment.
A subset of this set is Focus which approaches the elements in the environment in a sequential way
and governs the visual and aural experience. According to the model, Focus capacity is restricted
to a maximum of seven elements, a restriction that forces the structuring of perceived elements.
After that, section “Applications” presents applications of the model on different linguistic both
syntactic and phonological phenomena. We argue that the limits of Focus capacity rather than the
limitations of memory account for the fact that center-embedding is more complicated than initial
or final embedding and we provide a different answer to the question why lenition interactions are
typically counter-feeding. Section “Discussion,” finally, presents a conclusion and some discussion
and indicates possible directions for future research.
STRUCTURE IN LANGUAGE
Dual Structure in Language
One of the most striking aspects of all human languages (estimates are about 7000) is that
language is highly structured. Every language is characterized by what the French linguist André
Martinet has termed ‘l’articulation double’ or dual structure. That is, every utterance has both a
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morphosyntactic structure, conveying what the expression
means, as well as phonological structure, how the utterance is
pronounced. The first type of structure is most clearly seen in
cases of structural or syntactic ambiguity, like the sentence in (1).
(1) He sees his wife with his new glasses.
The double meaning is not due to the individual meaning of
the words in the sentence, but due to a different structuring of
the sentence. Either there is a subject who is seeing and an object
(his wife) as well as an instrument with which the subject sees (his
new glasses) or there is a subject who is seeing and an object (his
wife carrying/trying out etc. his new glasses). The two possible
morphosyntactic structures might be visualized in the form of
tree diagrams as the ones in Figure 1.
In Figure 1 NP stands for noun phrase, i.e., a group of words
of which the noun is the obligatory part (like he and his wife), a
VP stands for a verb phrase with obligatorily a verb (like sees), and
a PP for a preposition phrase with a preposition (like with in with
his glasses). The particular structure in Figure 1 is motivated by
the assumption that only one element or group can be moved to
the initial position. In Figure 1A the verb has one complement
which can be moved producing sentence (2a), which has the
same meaning. In Figure 1B the verb has two complements
each of which can be fronted, but not the two of them together.
So, for Figure 1B the sentences in (2b-c) are acceptable, but
not the one in (2a) which has a different meaning, that is, no
longer two complements (an object and an instrument), but one
single complement.
(2a) It is his wife with his new glasses that he sees
(2b) It is his wife that he sees with his new glasses
(2c) It is with his new glasses that he sees his wife
The second structure, the phonological structure, is most
clearly seen in cases where it is not isomorphic with the
morphosyntactic structure. Consider for instance the French
sentence in (3).
(3) Nous avons appris le français grâce à nos enseignants
We-have-learned-French-thanks-to-our-teachers
The morphosyntactic structure of utterance (3) is clear. There
are an NP (nous) a VP (avons appris le français grâce à nos
enseignants) which contains a Verb (avons appris) an NP (le
français) and a PP (grâce à nos enseignants), visualized as in
Figure 2.
However, the phonological structure of utterance (3),
reflecting its pronunciation, is grouped differently. There are
14 syllables [nu] [za] [v ] [a] [p ] [l ] [frã] [sε] [g a] [sa] [no]
[zã] [s ε̃] [nã]. These 14 syllables are further grouped into three
(or possibly two depending on speech rate) accentual groups
or phonological phrases, where the final syllable (and possible
the initial syllable) of each accentual group is characterized
by being more prominent (stronger and stressed) than the
preceding syllables, which is indicated by boldface. The three
possible groups are: ([nu] [za] [v ]), ([a] [p i] [l ] [frã] [sε]),
and ([g a] [sa] [no][zã] [s ε̃] [nã]). There is clearly no one-to-
one mapping between units of the morphosyntactic structure
and units of the phonological structure. The noun Nous or the
preposition grâce for instance are one element, one morpheme,
an N and a P, in the morphosyntactic structure, but divide
over two syllables in the phonological structure. Similarly, the
verb avons appris is one single unit, an inflected verb, in the
morphosyntactic structure, but is divided over two accentual
groups or phonological phrases in the phonological structure.
The utterance with the two structures is visualized in Figure 3,
where the Greek letter σ stands for syllable and the Greek letter ϕ
for phonological phrase.
In this section, we have seen that human language is
structured and that languages have a dual structure. The
fundamental question is, where does this structure come from,
in the next section we will further investigate the two types of
linguistic structure.
Structure in Language and the Magical
Number 7-2
Miller (1956) reported on perception experiments involving tone
height and observed that seven is an upper limit when it comes to
discriminating and classifying different tones. This is consistent
with a general use in psychology of seven-point rating scales,
given the intuition that adding more or trying to rate into finer
categories does not add much to the usefulness of the ratings.
With respect to the tones experiments he remarks: “[the] results
[up to six different classes HB/HJ] indicate that, at least for
pitches, this intuition is fairly sound. [. . .] if you can discriminate
five high-pitched tones in one series and five low-pitched tones in
another series, it is reasonable to expect that you could combine
all ten into a single series and still tell them all apart without error.
When you try it, however, it does not work. The channel capacity
for pitch seems to be about six and that is the best you can
do.” The number seven is also mentioned by Martin (2011), who
illustrated its relevance for the second type of structure discussed
above, the phonological structure. If a sound string in French1
is longer than seven syllables, the listener is forced to group the
string in higher-order constituents, that form accentual groups.
An accentual group, therefore, is never larger than seven syllables.
Also, if an utterance exceeds seven accentual groups, a break
is required, both in oral and in written language. In (4) this is
illustrated with an example taken from Martin (2011).
The utterance in (4a) consists of 32 syllables, as indicated
in (4b) where the dots mark syllable boundaries. Given that an
accentual group has an upper limit of seven syllables, there need
to be, minimally five accentual groups. The way the utterance
was actually realized shows the relevance of the number 5. It was
divided into eight accentual groups, with each group containing
at most five syllables, indicated by the square brackets with
the number of syllables the group contains, as illustrated in
1In languages such as Dutch, English or German there is an intermediate
structure between the syllable and the phonological phrase, where syllables
are grouped in binary feet. A phonological phrase or accentual group can
therefore contain more than seven syllables. A German compound word such
as (Eisen)(bahn)(knoten)(punkt)(hinund)(her)(schieber), for instance, is one
phonological phrase that contains 11 syllables and 7 feet of which the stressed
syllables are given in boldface. The prediction again is that simplex words can never
contain more than 7 feet.
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FIGURE 1 | Two possible morphosyntactic structures: (A) the verb has one complement, which can be moved to the initial position, and (B) the verb has two
complements, each of which can be fronted.
FIGURE 2 | The Morphosyntactic structure of utterance (3).
(4a) Mais puisqu’il faut bien formaliser un tel engagement avec des mots Jacques Chirac les 
a prononcés oui je suis candidat. 
(4b) Mais puisqu’il faut bien| formaliser| un tel engagement| avec des mots|
[mɛ.pwi.skil.fo.bjɛ͂ 5] [fɔʁ.ma.li.ze 4]  [ɛ.͂tɛ lɑ͂.ɡaʒ.mɑ͂ 5] [a.vɛk.de.mo 4]
Jacques Chirac| les a prononcés | (pause) oui | je suis candidat 
[ʒak.ʃi.ʁak 3] [le.za.pʁo.nɔ.͂se 5] [wi  1] [ʒǝ.swi.kɑ͂.di.da 5]
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FIGURE 3 | The grammatical structure (above) does not coincide with the phonological structure (below).
(4b). Notice that since the actual way in which the utterance
was realized has more than seven accentual groups, a pause is
required, which was indeed realized after the 6th accentual group.
The division of individual sounds into syllables and the
psycholinguistic reality of syllables is motivated by the existence
of language games where, for instance, the syllables within a
word are inverted, as in French Verlan, so that parents ‘parents’
[pa.rã] or vacances [va.kãs], for instance, are realized as rentspa
[rã.pa] and cancesva [kãz.va]. If speakers could not gain implicit
awareness of the way they divide words into syllables, they would
not be able to manipulate them in a language game. Slips of
the tongue, like Spooner’s "queer old dean" instead of “dear old
queen,” in a similar way, show that the segmentation of the
speech signal, that is decoding the acoustic signal into a series
of discrete sounds and in syllables, is a psycho-linguistic reality.
If speakers did not decode the acoustic signal, in which, in fact,
there is continuous overlap between sounds and in which neither
syllables nor segments are physically present as discrete elements
or units, they would not be able to invert single sounds.
The discrete sounds that listeners perceive are not atomic
elements but are themselves further internally structured. One
of the most important discoveries of structuralism linguistics in
the 20th century is without any doubt the phoneme. Sounds
differ in whether they are meaningful elements or not. If
they are meaningful, they are called phonemes, if not, they
are considered contextual variants of a sound and are called
allophones. In French, the sounds [l] and [r] can appear in the
same phonological contexts, finally, as in le bal ‘the ball’ and
le bar ‘the bar,’ initially, as in lire ‘to read’ and rire ‘to laugh,’
and intervocalically, as in le boulot ‘the work’ and le bourreau
‘the hangman.’ The difference between the two sounds is the
only difference in the pronunciation of each pair of words. The
distribution of the two sounds is free, in the sense that the
occurrence of the one or the other is not determined by the
position in the word. In a language like Korean, the distribution
of the two sounds is not free, but contextually determined. In
intervocalic position only [r] occurs, but never [l]. In other
positions (initially or finally) only [l] occurs, but never [r]. In
Korean, the occurrence of [r] is thus determined by the position
in the word. As such, the two sounds in Korean can never form
meaningful distinctions, whereas they can do that in French. The
two sounds are thus phonemes in French but are allophones,
that is, contextually determined variants of a single phoneme, in
Korean. The phoneme was considered not to be an atomic unit,
but rather was argued to consist of a set of distinctive features,
such as [±voice] referring to presence or absence of vocal fold
vibration or [±continuant], referring to continuous airflow or
complete obstruction of it.
The next two examples show the psycholinguistic relevance of
distinctive features. At a normal speech rate, the first consonant
of the Dutch verbs ‘to go,’ ‘to find’ and ‘to sit’ are pronounced as
[7], [v] and [z] in (5a), but as [x], [f], and [s] in (5b). On the other
hand, the last consonant of the 1st person singular pronoun ik is
pronounced, not as [k] as in (5b), but as [g] in (5c).
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(5a) Zij gaat [zεi7a:t] ‘she goes’ Zij vindt [zεivInt] ‘she finds’ Zij zit [zεizIt] ‘she sIts’
(5b) Ik ga [Ikxa] ‘I go’ Ik vind [IkfInt] ‘I find’ Ik zit [IksIt] ‘I sIt’
(5c) Ik denk [Igdεnk] ‘I think’ Ik bid [IgbIt] ‘I pray’
In (5b) we observe progressive voice assimilation, the second
consonant, that is the [7], [v] and [z], assimilates to the first
consonant, the [k], and takes over its characteristic of being
unvoiced. In (5c), there is regressive voice assimilation, the first
consonant, the [k], assimilates to the voicing of the second one,
the [d] and the [b], and takes over its characteristic of being
voiced. The sounds represented by the letters g, z and v, that is,
[7], [z] and [v], have two features in common, [+voice] referring
to vocal fold vibration and [+continuant] referring to continuous
airflow. In Dutch the combination of these two features is shared
by these three sounds, but by no other Dutch sound, which is
what specifies them as a group. As a group they are treated
in a systematically different way from other sounds by Dutch
speakers. Similarly, the two sounds that are involved in triggering
regressive assimilation in (5c), the [b] and the [d], share the
features [+voice] and [–continuant] which again sets them off
as a group against all other consonants of Dutch. Importantly,
if sounds were treated by speakers as atomic units, there would
be no way in which the grouping of the sounds [d], [b] and
the sounds [7], [z], and [v], into precisely these two groups,
the voiced plosives and the voiced fricatives would be a natural
or a logical one.
The distinctive features themselves are grouped into subsets
which can be visualized as in Figure 4 (Gussenhoven and Jacobs,
2017, p. 238). The motivation for this grouping of the distinctive
features into subsets, again is motivated on the basis of possible
modifications that groups of sounds undergo, as in the examples
in (5). Such modifications in languages may target a single
feature or a single subset of features, but never refer to two
subsets at the same time. For features the number 7 shows
also up. For the coronal sounds, the two features allow for
four contrastive sounds2 and for six possible contrasts. Clements
(2009) observes that a phonetic theory which recognizes the
phonetic categories, that is the possible places of articulation
(dental and alveolar) and the possible tongue shapes (apical/tip
or laminal/blade), ‘apicodental,’ ‘apicoalveolar,’ ‘laminodental,’
‘laminoalveolar,’ ‘palatoalveolar,’ ‘retroflex,’ and ‘palatal’ allows for
7 sounds and 21 possible contrasts. Up to this point, we have
primarily focused on spoken language. But it should be noticed
that the same duality of structure and a similar internal structure
along the lines of Figure 4 above also exist in sign language. We
refer to, among others, Sandler (1993); van der Hulst (1993), and
Crasborn and van der Kooij (2013) for some further discussion of
the internal phonological representation of signs.
So to summarize, the fact that language is structured is evident
from the morphosyntactic sentence structure, as in Figure 1,
from the division of strings into accentual groups, from the
division of accentual groups into syllables, from the division of
syllables into discrete categories of vowels and consonant and
2Evans (1995) shows that Kayardild for instance contrasts a laminodental [t]̪,
an apicoalveolar [t], a lamino-prepalatal [c] and a retroflex [ ] voiceless coronal
plosive.
from the division of individual sounds into groups of features.
Besides recurring structure there is also the number 5 that is
recurring. It showed up in the grouping of sentence (4a) into
eight accentual groups of five syllables each, and, given the
eight accentual groups, larger than seven, the necessity of a
pause after six groups. Upper limit 7 and the number 5 show
up in the five main categories of sentence structure (NP, VP,
AP, PP, AdvP), but also in the upper limit of consonants in
a syllable. Georgian (Butskhrikidze, 2002) has unusually long
sequences of consonants, such as /prckvn3/, /mc’vrtn/, /brt’X’/ in
words like /prckvna/ ‘to peel,’ /mc’vrtneli/ ‘trainer,’ /brt’X’eli/ ‘flat.’
The longest sequence of consonants in the initial position of a
syllable is maximally 5.
The role of the number 5 shows also up in the internal
structure of the individual segment. If five determines an upper
limit of structuring, the features given in Figure 4, a total
number of 21 need to be further structured. And they indeed
are as indicated in Figure 4. Evidence for the internal structure
again can be provided by the way human speakers systematically
modify the sounds of their languages when pronouncing them
in a given context, as exemplified in (5) above. It should also be
mentioned that not all the features in Figure 4 are present in
every language. The model in Figure 4 allows to characterize any
sound of any human language and any group of sounds that in a
language behaves in systematically the same way as a natural class,
that is, as a collection of sounds identifiable as a single subset
of Figure 4. For instance, in the example in (5) above what is
modified is the LARYNGEAL node of the consonants involved.
Awareness of Structures in Language
Human beings have no explicit knowledge of the fact that
language is highly structured nor of the psychological processes
that are involved when they speak. As Roberts (2017) so
eloquently puts it: “We are mostly as blissfully unaware of the
intricacies of the structure of language as fish are of the water
they swim in. We live in a mental ocean of nouns, verbs,
quantifiers, morphemes, vowels and other rich, strange and
deeply fascinating linguistic objects.”
Although speakers are unaware of, for instance, the dual
structure of language, the mere fact that speakers of English are
able to grasp the two meanings of the sentence in (1) above,
shows that they have awareness of the first type of structure.
Moreover, native speakers have clear intuitions about what is or
what is not acceptable or grammatical in terms of words and
sentences in their language. Dutch native speakers will all agree
that a sentence like Morgen komt Piet ‘tomorrow-comes-Piet’ is
3It should be observed that [v] (Butskhrikidze, 2002, p. 109) is considered to be
a secondary articulation on the preceding consonant, so that the longest surface
sequence contains maximally five consonants. For a more detailed account we refer
to Butskhrikidze (2002) where it is argued that these surface sequences can arise by
the deletion of a vowel or by adding a consonantal affix.
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FIGURE 4 | Feature geometry.
acceptable, but a sentence like Morgen Piet komt ‘tomorrow-Piet-
comes’ is not. These sentences, if translated into French, will
be judged differently by native French speakers. They will all
agree that a sentence like Demain vient Pierre is unacceptable,
whereas Demain Pierre vient is not. Similarly, as mentioned
above, the ability to invert the syllables of a word (in language
games) or parts of the syllable (in slips of the tongue) shows that
perceiving the acoustic signal as discrete sounds and in syllables
is a cognitive process. If speakers did not decode the acoustic
signal, in which there is continuous overlap between sounds and
in which neither syllables nor segments are physically present as
discrete elements or units, they would not be able to invert single
sounds. Moreover, whereas speech production is highly variable
and gradient, speech perception is categorical and not gradient.
For instance, the Spanish minimal pair gasa ‘gas’ and casa ‘house’
in a concrete recording of a female native speaker of Spanish
shows in the acoustic signal a difference of a negative voice onset
time for the [g] of –80 ms. This means that the vocal folds start
to vibrate 1/10 of a second before the release of the closure. For
the [k] a 10 ms positive VOT was measured, meaning that the
vocal folds start to vibrate 1/100 of a second after the release of the
closure. Taking steps and reducing the negative VOT by 20 ms per
step leads to a switching point at around –20, where respondents
start hearing it as [k]. At –60 and at –40 they still perceive it as
[g]. Importantly, they will always perceive it as either [g] or [k],
but never as something in between. Where does this categorical
perception come from, and where does the structure in general
and most importantly the upper limit of 5–7 come from? We will
address that question in the next paragraph.
Where Does Structure Come From?
The main goal of theoretical linguistics since the 60’s of the
previous century has been to characterize the tacit linguistic
knowledge, the linguistic competence of native speakers. (1965:
200) observes that “It seems clear that many children acquire
first or second languages quite successfully even though no
special care is taken to teach them and no special attention is
given to their progress. It also seems apparent that much of
the actual speech observed consists of fragments and deviant
expressions of a variety of sorts. Thus it seems that a child must
have the ability to "invent" a generative grammar that defines
well-formedness and assigns interpretations to sentences even
though the primary linguistic data that he uses as a basis for this
act of theory construction may, from the point of view of the
theory he constructs, be deficient in various respects.” Chomsky’s
explanation for the rapidity with which children are able to
acquire any human language that they are exposed to thus is
that humans have an inborn, innate language faculty or language
acquisition device for which the input is the language exposed
to and for which the output is the grammar or the competence
of the language being acquired. This innate language faculty, or
language instinct (Pinker, 1994), is traditionally termed Universal
Grammar (UG). Focusing on distinctive features, the assumption
of an innate set of distinctive features (around 20 all in all)
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is advocated by for instance Hale and Reiss (2008). Over the
last decade the assumption of an innate language faculty has
been subject to a lot of debate (cf. for instance, among others,
Evans and Levinson, 2009; Levinson and Evans, 2010). The main
reason for doubting an innate language faculty or an innate
set of distinctive features was based on the observation that
structural aspects claimed to be universal were not attested
in every language. To give just two examples, recursion, the
backbone of UG (Hauser et al., 2002) has been claimed not
to exist in Pirahã (cf. discussions in Everett, 2005; Nevins
et al., 2009) and the syllable has been argued to be absent
as a relevant notion in Gokana (Hyman, 2011) or Japanese
(Labrune, 2012).
The interesting question that then arises is where does
structure come from if not from UG? Where does phonological
knowledge, such as the categorization of the acoustic signal
into a string of discrete segments containing distinctive features,
come from? If we dismiss the Chomskyan UG hypothesis
and the universal set of distinctive features it contains (in
the Hale and Reiss, 2008 view) the structures (syntactic
categories, morphosyntactic structure, syllable structure and
the internal structure of sounds) that we observe on the
basis of linguistic evidence have to come from somewhere
else. The typical answer provided by those who reject the
innatist view, is that it comes from, or emerges from, language
usage rather than being part of UG (Johnson, 1997; Bybee,
2006; van de Weijer, 2014; Van de Weijer, 2017; Archangeli
and Pulleyblank, 2015; and many others). Although there are
a lot of different usage-based approaches to language, such
as, among others, Construction Grammar (cf. for instance
Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006) and Exemplar-Theory (cf.,
among others, Johnson, 1997; Pierrehumbert, 2001), they all
share the assumption that there is no innate universal grammar,
but that instead, grammatical knowledge emerges in usage. It
would be far beyond the scope of the present paper to give
a comprehensive overview of the different approaches. For a
more detailed discussion of the two different approaches (innate
vs. usage-based) we refer to Dąbrowska (2015) and Pleyer
and Hartmann (2019), who discuss, with respect to language
evolution, to what extent the two approaches show divergences
as well as convergences. Here, we will just limit ourselves to
one particular illustration (van de Weijer, 2014, which is based
on Exemplar theory). The key idea of Exemplar theory is that
individual manifestations of aspects of experience are stored
and leave true traces in memory. New instances are compared
against stored traces. “Every token of experience is classified and
placed in a vast organizational network as part of the decoding
process. New tokens of experience are not decoded and discarded,
but rather they impact memory representations. In particular,
a token of linguistic experience that is identical to an existing
exemplar is mapped onto that exemplar, strengthening it. Tokens
that are similar but not identical (differing in slight ways in
meaning, phonetic shape, pragmatics) to existing exemplars are
represented as exemplars themselves and are stored near similar
exemplars to constitute clusters or categories.” (Bybee, 2006,
p. 716).
van de Weijer (2014) provides the following example. In
Dutch, a certain group of consonants, that is [v], [z], [b], [d], and
[7], is realized, in final position, as [f], [s], [p], [t], and [x]. The
first person singular and plural of verbs like wij geven and ik geef
‘we give, I give’ wij lezen and ik lees ‘we read, I read,’ wij hebben
and ik heb ‘we have, I have,’ wij wedden and ik wed ‘we bet, I bet’
and wij zeggen and ik zeg ‘we say, I say’ differ precisely in this
respect, that is a voiceless consonant in the singular verb forms,
but a voiced one in the plural forms. Words that in the plural form
do not have a voiced consonant, like boffen ‘to be lucky,’ wensen
‘to wish,’ meppen ‘to bang,’ zetten ‘to put down’ or lachen ‘to laugh’
have the same consonant in the singular and plural forms.
From an innatist point of view, there is an innate feature
[voice] which is part of the innate universal phonological
vocabulary and a language-specific rule of final devoicing, or
for that matter, two universal constraints, both part of UG.
A constraint IDENTITY [VOICE], requiring that input and output
forms are identical with respect to the feature value for voice, that
is [+voice] should surface as [+voice] and [–voice] as [–voice]
and a constraint which only allows voiceless obstruents in final
position, ∗VOICED-CODA. Depending on the relative ranking of
these two constraints, two language types can be identified. If
∗VOICED-CODA is more important than IDENTITY [VOICE] a
language with final devoicing results, if not one without. For
Dutch the former ranking applies, for English the latter. The
Dutch language learner only needs to memorize one consonant,
that is the one that occurs in the plural form, and can derive or
compute the alternating one by the phonological grammar.
In an ET (Exemplar Theory) account it works as follows. Every
heard form is stored which leads to forms as a cloud of tokens and
to relations between forms such as the ones in Figure 5.
The stored alternations will lead speakers to discover the
generalization that in final position no voiced obstruents are
allowed. Constraints such as IDENTITY [VOICE] and ∗VOICED-
CODA can thus, as argued for by van de Weijer (2014) be derived
from exposure to the language or emerge in language use, but
are not innate, being learnable on the basis of date, they emerge
naturally. But why would that be required, if everything is stored?
Why is there structure at all in language? Why are sign languages
structured and why do they not use only iconic signs? Why
does spoken language not consist of unstructured vocalizations
coupled with morphemes (Gussenhoven and Jacobs, 2017, p. 11)?
Why is there categorical perception if slightly different ways in
phonetic shape are stored?
In the next section, we will develop our own view, which
takes sides with usage-based approaches in the sense that
exposure to language is required for the learning of language-
specific structure to arise (such, as for instance whether it is
VO or OV), but differs to the extent that structure as such
is not derived from exposure to language, but is a direct
result of the way in which the cognitive system works in
perception. Bybee (2010) argues that the structure emerges
from abstractions of language use by domain general cognitive
processes such as “chunking, rich memory storage, analogy
and cross-modal associations” (Bybee, 2010, p. 7). Chunking
is the process triggering the formation and use of formulaic
or prefabricated sequences of words, such as for instance eat
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FIGURE 5 | A cloud of tokens and relations between forms.
your heart out, and is the basic mechanism responsible for
the formation of constructions and constituent structure. The
cognitive focus model that we will address in the next section
not only provides a straightforward answer to the question why
chunking exists in language, but also, why language does not
consist of unstructured vocalizations coupled with morphemes
(Gussenhoven and Jacobs, 2017, p. 11), which in principle could
be the case and could be learnable. We will argue that the only
way in which cognition can interact with the environment is
by imposing structure on it, which is a direct result from the
cognitive focus model in section “Toward a Gestalt-like approach
to structure in language.” That is, the only way in which cognition
can interact with the environment is by imposing structure on it.
Christiansen and Chater (2008) define a number of constraints
that shape language for each generation of language learners
and users and that determine general learning and processing.
Besides constraints from thought, perceptuo-motor constraints
and pragmatic constraints, they define cognitive constraints on
sequential learning and processing. The cognitive focus model
that is the topic of the next section can be considered as a more
formal account of such cognitive constraints such as chunking.
TOWARD A GESTALT-LIKE APPROACH
TO STRUCTURE IN LANGUAGE
One may wonder why we discussed in section “Structure in
language” such divergent topics which at first sight have nothing
to do with each other. However, our claim is that we can explain
these phenomena based on one and the same theory. Buffart
(2017) formulated its principles. We will discuss his starting
points and his conclusions without going into the details of his
proofs since these are of a purely mathematical nature.
General Principles
There are two different views on the way humans process the
outside world. One view basically considers the human system as
a sort of information processing mechanism. More specifically,
the system receives stimulation or input and processes this. In
this way, the structures in the outside world are projected into
the inside. Research in this area has emphasized the mechanism
of information processing. It is outside-in. The other, opposing,
view is basically one that is inside-out. It emphasizes that
humans build structures. Research in this area has emphasized
the experience of structure.
Naturally, both views have a lot in common. The outside-
in view does not deny that humans interpret the environment
and the second view does not deny that there are structures
outside and that there is some type of processing in the brain.
However, the theoretical presuppositions completely differ. The
brain processing model of Buffart (2017), which will be used
in this paper, has been based on the second view. It fits
within the so-called Gestalt psychology which finds its roots
in the publications of Mach (1886) and von Ehrenfels (1890).
Gestalt theory emphasizes that it is the observer who creates the
experienced structures (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1947, 1969). Thus,
a subject operates on its environment.
Buffart (2017) assumes that a subject focuses when operating
on its surroundings4. He further assumes that a subject/system
in focus5 experiences a sequence of elements in its surroundings.
The surroundings and thus the elements are not specified.
Elements are sets of operations on its surroundings as well, for
example a set that refers to the experience of a tree, a lion, a letter
or a square. Within a sequence a subject can experience relations.
A relation between two elements does not mean that these
elements are similar. It only means that under some viewpoint
these elements have something in common. Examples can be seen
in Figure 6.
A subject builds representations. A representation is a set
(the whole) of relations between the elements (the parts) of a
sequence. There are different modes of relations, such as “blue,”
“square,” “red” and “a” in Figure 6. For a mode there are two types
of position relations. Elements can be neighbors, let us call it type
A relations, or non-neighbors, let us call it type B relations (see
Figure 6). If two non-neighbors have a relation, all elements in
between are treated as one element at the current surface level.
For example, p, f and l in apfla are grouped together a(pfl)a.
A basic assumption is that in a Focus-representation there
is no interference between different modes and different types,
which means that in a representation an element can be involved
in only one type and only one mode. So, let in the following
4The term surroundings is used to avoid a confusion with the physical
environment. Surroundings contains more than the environment. We will come
back to that in section “Focus versus Memory” and in the section “Discussion.”
5The term Focus is used to avoid confusion with other terms in cognition. We
would like to emphasize here that Focus is not Attention. We will come back to
that in the section “Discussion.”
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FIGURE 6 | Types of modes and relations.
sequences G represent elements that are in some way (e.g.,
same color, content or sound) related to each other. Then the
sequence GGHG can be described by two types of representation
relations: type A, GG followed by two elements (HG) and type
B, G(GH)G with two concatenated elements in between. In a
more abstract way: If we denote the related elements by X and
the non-related elements by Y and Z, valid representations are
XXYZ (type A; GGHG), X(YZ)X (type B; G(GH)G), and YXZX
(type B as well; GGHG), where X, Y, and Z refer to elements G or
H depending on their position. Notice that in this case the type
A representation together with a type B representation covers
the structure of the whole sequence XXZX, as do both type B
representations together as well. For example, XXYZ means the
first and second elements are related and X(YZ)X means the first
and last elements are related, so that both together imply that the
first, second and last elements are related. One calls such a pair
complementary representations since they cover the structure of
the whole sequence.
From these assumptions a mathematical theorem, which
we will not explain here (see Buffart, 2017 for a detailed
account), follows according to which in every sequence that
does not contain more than seven elements all similarities of
one mode can be represented with at most two complementary
representations. For sequences that have more than seven
elements one needs in some cases more than two representations.
Moreover, representations with 5, 6, or 7 elements have similar
characteristics. Representations with fewer elements differ.
Buffart observed that this finding is remarkable since 5 up to 7,
or 7 minus 2, as discussed in section “Structure in language and
the magical number 7–2” above, is an often discussed question
in cognition and language research and the occurrence of two
representations at the same time is known in visual perception
research as duality (Rock, 1977) or complementarity (van Tuijl
and Leeuwenberg, 1979). On the basis of these facts, Buffart states
that in Focus each representation has a maximum length of seven
and maximal two representations can be active together. This
statement only holds for Focus.
Focus Versus Memory
Buffart (2017) defined the cognitive system as a set of
operations on its surroundings. This surroundings can be the
world outside the body but also the memory content, being
operations as well. Focus has been introduced as a subset of
this set, of which the operations approach the elements in
the surroundings in a sequential way. It governs the “inside-
outside” experience. The role of Focus is comparable with
the role of “Apperception” as Wundt (1903) describes it.
Due to the mathematical results described in the foregoing
section Focus capacity has been restricted to a maximum
of seven elements. This restriction forces structure, called
representation. Since even the elements in a representation are
“inside” operations, i.e., representations of other experiences,
Focus also governs the structure of notions, ideas, images,
melodies and so on.
In addition to Focus there is Memory. In Memory these
representations are stored. Storing means retaining the relations
between the elements within a representation and between
representations. Since a sequence in Focus can have more than
one representation, these representations become connected
through their elements. These elements themselves are clusters
of representations as well. In this way a network is built.
Notice that in Memory several representations can be activated,
but in Focus at most two, one of which is the one that is
momentarily preferred.
In short, in Focus at most two representations are active and
their sequences have maximally seven elements. Systems with
a maximum of 5, 6, or 7 elements are indistinguishable with
respect to the type of representations. The differences between
these systems are processing capacity and number of connections
in Memory. In Memory several representations can be active,
but in Focus only two, one of which is the most active one. The
elements in a representation are (clusters of) representations as
well. If a sequence is longer than 5, 6, or 7, Focus will cluster
two or more elements into one element. It builds a representation
of this shrunken sequence and as a part of it a representation of
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the cluster. So, not sounds, consonants, letters, words, sentences,
melodies or objects are stored in Memory, but their various
representations, of which the limitations are dictated by Focus.
Focus is the gate between Memory and the “outside” world. It
plays its role in perception and production. This corresponds
with the basic assumption of Gestalt Psychology that the system
is always active, or in short, perception is production.
APPLICATIONS
Successful applications of the theoretical principles in vision
are known since 1969 (Leeuwenberg, 1969, 1971). We will
apply them onto several phenomena in language. We will
show that the notion of an innate language faculty is not
peculiar, since its core properties, recursion and the merger
of elements into higher elements (the language faculty in
its narrow sense, Hauser et al., 2002), follow from the
limitations of Focus, or to put it differently, from the way
the brain works in general. We will show how the Focus
properties straightforwardly account for some basic notions
of a Universal Grammar. We will give a new explanation
of Latin liquid dissimilation. We will develop a way of
modeling consonants and so explain the historical and actual
shifts between them.
Before discussing these applications in more detail, we
would like to emphasize that the theory does not describe any
processing other than preference. Focus is a general principle
filter that forces the cognitive structures, and processing of these
structures takes place in Memory determining what the actual
representation is. We will come back to that in the discussion.
Language
According to the theory, systems with a Focus-capacity from
five up to seven possess the same type of operations; they may
differ in processing speed and the connectivity in Memory. If
communication mechanisms in a society must be usable for
all users/humans, their structures must be based on the lowest
capacity, a Focus-capacity of five. So, the prediction is, that
in almost all spoken or sign-languages the maximum sequence
length in terms of elements is five. Given that the theory is
essentially based on sequential analyses of the surroundings, it
follows that in principle language use is linear, as Frank et al.
(2012) stated. We think that all structural aspects of language can
be understood as a consequence of Focus-capacity.
After a short remark on the language faculty we will
discuss embeddedness since it reveals the difference between
Universal Grammars and Focus-theory. Finally, we will argue
that the hierarchical structure of sentences is not necessarily
stored in Memory.
The Language Faculty
Due to the Focus limitation language expressions are broken up
in general into maximal five elements, which could themselves
be expressions as well. Since the Focus limitations are an inborn
property, scientists, following the line of thought as laid down in
Chomsky (1965), who state that natural languages are structured
and that this rests on an innate property, are right. It is an inborn
property in the sense that the restriction of Focus is an inborn
property. Its limitations enforce structure. Parsing a sentence,
for example, shows a division in five parts: subject, verb, direct
object, indirect object and adjuncts. The assumption of an inborn
language faculty, however, is not warranted. Moreover, structure
does not necessarily imply a generative grammar. Generative
grammar in principle implies that center-embedding is as natural
as final embedding, also called cross-dependency recursion, and
that the depth of embedding is unlimited. Karlsson (2007, 2010)
and Christiansen and Chater (2015) have shown on the basis of a
corpus of written speech that there is a limit to center-embedding.
The logical depth might be unlimited (Chomsky and Miller,
1963), but the cognitive depth isn’t. Karlsson (2010) states that
the overall results on multiple center-embedding mainly depends
on the limitations of working memory. We, instead, would say
on Focus-capacity.
Views on Embeddedness
The classical textbook example of center-embedding is the
sentence in (6a) (Chomsky and Miller, 1963, p. 286). Its final
embedded counterpart is the sentence in (6b). A sentence
like (6a) may seem harder to process than a sentence like
(6b), but within generative grammar there are no grammatical
restrictions against (6a).
(6a) Center-embedded The dog the cat the rat the malt ate
killed chased.
(6b) Final embedded The dog chased the cat that killed
the rat that ate the malt
We will discuss the problem of embeddedness on the basis
of some Dutch examples. Dutch has been traditionally analyzed
(Koster, 1975) as being underlying an SOV language. In Dutch,
the V is the second element of a main clause, but follows the
complements in a subordinate clause, as illustrated in (7).
(7) Main clause, V-second: Jan gaf een boek aan zijn vrouw
John-gave-a book-to-his-wife




This means that both sentences in (7) in that particular
analysis in generative grammar are base generated as having
an OV structure, the surface structure of main clauses is then
derived by placing the V of the main clause in second position.
This implies that a final embedded sentence like (8a) is base
generated as in (8b).




(8b) Hans [dat] Jan [dat] Piet [dat] Wim de krant las geloofde
dacht zei
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The underlying reduced and simplified structure is given in
Figure 7. In order to get the actual final embedded sentence as it is
realized in speech, every S in Figure 7, except the first one, needs
to be moved (by a transformational rule termed S-Extraposition)
with all structure it contains below to the right of the V next to it,
as indicated by the blue arrows.
As remarked above, from a generative perspective, generating
embedded structures by rewriting a VP as consisting of either
a V and an S structure or an S and a V structure, or, as more
recently by merging a V and an S or an S and a V in a higher-order
VP structure is computationally speaking of the same complexity
and therefore predicted to be equally likely. Although this might
be true from a speaker or production-based perspective, the
situation is quite different from a listener or perception-based
perspective. Focus capacity, as we will argue, at the same time
both restricts the possibilities of embeddedness and forces the
recursion structures in final embeddedness. Focus-capacity also
restricts the recursion depth. To illustrate this, we show below
seven Dutch examples of recursion, based on variations on the
final embedded sentence in (9).
(9) De poes die de hond krabde die de man beet die het kind
sloeg dat de mug inslikte is zwart.
The-cat-that-the-dog-scratched-that-the-man-bit-that-
the-child-hit-that-the-mosquito-swallowed-is-black
In the examples below, FC means the Focus-capacity needed
for parsing the surface structure of a sentence at once. An element
of the surface structure is a word or a sub sentence or even
a complex structure that a listener must recall to understand
the sentence. We use the symbol ≥ to indicate the Focus
capacity needed. Given that we do not know the details that a
subject really includes, we can only count the minimum capacity
needed. Notice the clear difference between the center-embedded
recursion in the sentences (9a), (9c), and (9e) and the final
embedding, or cross-dependency recursion, in the sentences (9b),
(9d), and (9f) respectively.
(9a) FC needed ≥ 9
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog), ([3] that (the man), ([4] that
(the child), ([5] that (the mosquito) swallowed), [6] hit), [7]
bit), [8] scratched), [9] is black
(9b) FC needed ≥ 6
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog) scratched, ([3] that (the
man) bit, ([4] that (the child) hit, ([5] that (the mosquito)
swallowed)))), [6] is black
(9c) FC needed ≥ 7
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog), ([3] that (the man), ([4] that
(the child) hit), [5] bit), [6] scratched), [7] is black
(9d) FC needed ≥ 5
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog) scratched, ([3] that (the man)
bit, ([4] that (the child) hit))), [5] is black
(9e) FC needed ≥ 5
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog), ([3] that (the man) bit), [4]
scratched), [5] is black
(9f) FC needed ≥ 4
[1] The cat, ([2] that (the dog) scratched, ([3] that (the man)
bit)), [4] is black
(9g) FC needed ≥ 3
[1} The cat, ([2] that (the dog) scratched), [3] is black
The sentences (9a-c) are problematic. This does not mean
that sentences with a recursion depth of 3 or more (4 or more
sentences) are impossible. But one can only understand or
produce them with the involvement of Memory, evading the
restrictions of Focus. As a consequence, one may find them in
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written language easier than in spoken language. But even in
written language the depths are finite (Karlsson, 2007, 2010). The
reason for the restricted depth is that Focus operates sequentially.
In a similar way as in (9), one can calculate for utterances (8a) and
(8b) the minimal FC needed as shown in (10a) and (10b). Again,
there is a clear difference between the center-embedded and the
final embedded sentence.
(10a) FC needed ≥ 4
[1] (Hans said) ([2]that (Jan thought) ([3]that (Piet
believed) ([4]that (Wim read the journal))))
(10b) FC needed ≥ 7
[1] Hans ([2] [that] Jan ([3] [that] Piet ([4] [that] Wim read
the journal) [5] believed) [6] thought) [7] said
The Structure of Language According to Focus
A strong point of the hierarchical description of languages is, that
the grouping of elements in one larger element is not arbitrary.
Focus has two grouping mechanisms. (1) When neighbors are
related (Type A) these elements will form one new element. (2)
When two non-neighbor elements have a relation (type B), all
elements in between are grouped into one expression. In other
words, the building of a new element by combining elements
can be understood as a property of Focus. Articles, adjectives,
and nouns are strong examples of the first type of grouping
mechanism and will be grouped together in one larger element.
Recursion is a strong example of the latter kind of grouping.
Although the grouping may seem clear for these examples, it is
not so clear for situations where the meaning or the context plays
a role. Examples are the sentences below. Sentences (11a) and
(11b) are ambiguous, which means that there are (at least) two
almost equally strong interpretations. The grouping depends on
the meaning. If “better” is meant to be related to “with his new
glasses” sentence (11c) is a better formulation than (11b), since
it is not ambiguous. As a reply to a question like “John wears
his new glasses; who does he see?” the grouping in (11a) and
(11b) is unambiguous.
(11a) John sees his wife with his new glasses.
(11b) John sees his wife with his new glasses better.
(11c) John sees his wife better with his new glasses.
Focus does not prescribe order. From the viewpoint of Focus
the sentence “his John glasses new wife his sees with” is as
good as the sentence “John sees his wife with his new glasses.”
However, Focus has a maximum capacity. It means that the first
sentence cannot be used for good communication since grouping
is impossible so that the sentence is too long. As shown in
Figure 1 one can recognize one or two subgroups in sentence
(11a), so that it consists of three or four elements at surface level.
As argued, the maximum is five elements; if not, sentences are
cognitively inconceivable. This fully determines the grouping and
the ordering mechanisms in languages. The most effective way
of grouping is placing side by side what belongs to each other,
such as grouping preposition article adjectives and the noun,
or the words belonging to a subordinate clause, or verb and
subject, and verb and direct or indirect object. These groupings
guarantee that a surface level contains maximal five elements.
Sentence parsing reflects this in that it generally distinguishes
five categories (subject, verb, direct object, indirect object, and
adjunct). Given these groupings the order is free in principle
and one can use propositions to show the role of a noun as in
“John gives a book to Mary,” or a language may use order to
show this role as in “John gives Mary a book about fishing.”
Languages with declension have more freedom of order. Focus
handles sentences with a maximum length between 5 and 7
elements. Thus, utterances that do not group what belongs to
each other don’t pass Focus. In this sense, Focus forces the
preference for order that allows grouping to limit the length
of sentences, which as such provides a principled and formal
explanation for the claim defended in Futrell et al. (2015) that
dependency length minimization is a general property of human
information processing. Focus does not specify which order. So, a
specific order is not forced by Focus, but is an evolved property of
a language and thus usage based. It means that order preferences
may differ between languages, as for example “Morgen komt Piet”
and “Demain Pierre vient.”
To summarize it: Under Focus a sentence is limited to five
elements; a group can be an element at surface level; within a
surface level the order of the elements is free, apart from those
instances in which a language uses order to express relations.
One can make a drawing of the relations between a surface
level and its elements. When one starts from the subject and
verb in the main sentence and draws the elements and groups
down to the right one gets a global structure [see for example
Figure 8A for utterance (6b)]. One gets a global grammar
structure (see for example Figure 8B) if one uses the standard
grammar representation within each group. In a similar way
Figure 9 shows the structural representation of utterance (8a).
Notice the difference between the grammatical representations in
Figures 7, 9B.
If in a language a transposition of a set of elements is
allowed, then this property can be used to detect groups. See for
example utterances (2) in section “Dual structure in language.”
However, the more important point is that Focus theory provides
a straightforward answer why these groups exist. A theory of
language cannot take their existence for granted. Within a group
one can recognize elements and subgroups, but one cannot lift
such an element or subgroup out of this group. In sentence
(6b) “The dog chased the cat [that killed the rat (that ate the
malt)],” both sentences between brackets are adjectival clauses
comparable with adjectives. One is a group at the main level, the
other one is a subgroup of this group. The sentences in (2) given
in section “Dual structure in language” illustrate the classical
test case for whether one is dealing with one group or with two
different groups. Please recall that sentence (2a) “It is his wife
with his new glasses that he sees” is only possible for the sentence
in Figure 1B, where “his wife with his new glasses” is one single
group. Now let us consider the sentence in (12a).
(12a) Hij gaf [zijn vrouw] [een boek] [voor haar verjaardag]
[vorige week] [in Frankrijk]
He-gave-his-wife-a-book-for-her-birthday-last-week-in-
France.
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FIGURE 8 | A structural representation of utterance (6b) according to Focus: (A) its chunking structure and (B) a related grammar structure.
The fact that “vorige week” and “in Frankrijk” are separate
groups can be shown by the sentences (12b) and (12c) which can
be considered answers to questions like “Wanneer [when] gaf hij
etc.” or “Waar [where] gaf hij etc.”
(12b) Last week he gave his wife a book for her
birthday in France.
(12c) In France he gave his wife a book for her birthday last week.
The interesting observation is that according to Focus in (12a)
“vorige week in Frankrijk” can be considered a single group as
well, which is motivated by the sentences (12d), (12e) and (12f).
(12d) Last week in France he gave his wife a book
for her birthday.
(12e) He gave last week in France his wife a book
for her birthday.
(12f) He gave his wife last week in France a book
for her birthday.
Moreover, the utterances in (12d-f) are not only possible
they also seem to be preferred and more natural than (12a),
the plausible reason being that it limits the number of groups
to 5 instead of 6.
Focus and Memory
The theory states that Focus and Memory are distinct cognitive
functions. Buffart (2017) suggested that they originate from
different types of brain rhythms. A Focus event has a restricted
capacity, Memory has not.
Most intended messages have more than one representation.
When Memory is involved the elements of an expression are
related to each other by means of the various representations
of the message. Due to these relations, very complex messages
can be communicated, which, due to Focus, almost always
have a hierarchical communication structure. One sometimes
assumes that the hierarchy in utterances are represented in
Memory as well. However, hierarchy does not necessarily exist
in Memory. The non-sequential appearance of sentences is
due to the Focus limitations, which govern the communication
with the outside world, but it does not necessarily mean that
Memory operates in this way. In Memory, several connections
even between “lower” and “higher” level elements may exist,
which indicates that the message is represented by a network,
not by a hierarchical structure. Subjects can, for example, easily
rearrange words so that a different expression with the same
content appears. In language, a high variety of sentences can
express the same message. Especially in spoken language each
sentence is a rapid evolution of an “accidental” sequence of
concepts, depending on the prior concepts and the message
intended. All Dutch sentences below, for example, express
the same message.
(13a) Piet vond vandaag de bal, die Jan gisteren zonder enige
aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net sloeg, in het bos.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 649384
fpsyg-12-649384 June 16, 2021 Time: 16:16 # 14
Buffart and Jacobs Structure in Language




(13b) Vandaag vond Piet de bal, die Jan gisteren zonder enige
aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net sloeg, in het bos.
(13c) Piet vond de bal, die Jan gisteren zonder enige aarzeling in
het pas gerepareerde net sloeg, vandaag in het bos.
(13d) Gisteren sloeg Jan zonder enige aarzeling de bal, die Piet
vandaag in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13e) Jan sloeg gisteren zonder enige aarzeling de bal, die Piet
vandaag in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13f) Gisteren sloeg Jan de bal, die Piet vandaag in het bos vond,
zonder enige aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13g) Jan sloeg gisteren de bal, die Piet vandaag in het bos vond,
zonder enige aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13h) Zonder enige aarzeling sloeg Jan gisteren de bal, die Piet
vandaag in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13i) Gisteren sloeg Jan zonder enige aarzeling de bal, die
vandaag Piet in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde
net.
(13j) Jan sloeg gisteren zonder enige aarzeling de bal, die
vandaag Piet in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13k) Gisteren sloeg Jan de bal, die vandaag Piet in het bos vond,
zonder enige aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13l) Jan sloeg gisteren de bal, die vandaag Piet in het bos vond,
zonder enige aarzeling in het pas gerepareerde net.
(13m) Zonder enige aarzeling sloeg Jan gisteren de bal, die
vandaag Piet in het bos vond, in het pas gerepareerde
net.
Although each sentence is theoretically correct, and the
last five ones require a special emphasis on the word
“vandaag,” they are not equally preferred. Preference is a
property of Memory, not of Focus. Focus determines the
structure. Memory plays a decisive role in the preference
for a concrete utterance or perception, involving context and
previous experience. We will come back to that in the section
“Discussion.”
Phonology
The arguments why phonological structure exist and why the
number 5 turns up there are similar to those we used to
explain why Focus forces structures in language. We will not
repeat them here.
We will apply Focus-theory to three topics. The first one is
the hearing of consonants that are absent in the physical signal.
The second one regards the avoidance of interference between
the same consonants when in general two words or in particular
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a word and a suffix are concatenated. The third one concerns the
(non-)occurrence of certain shifts of consonants as for example
from [k] into [g], from [g] into [7], but not from [k] into [7].
Hearing Absent Consonants
One interesting phenomenon is that subjects easily can
perceive and produce consonants that are not in the acoustic
signal. Listeners can restore missing phonetic segments in
words they hear (Warren, 1970) and in speech shadowing
experiments (Marslen-Wilson and Welsh, 1978) talkers correct
mispronounced words to their correct pronunciation.
As Buffart (2017) argued, a structure that a subject perceives,
agrees with the environment when from the subject’s view that
structure suffices to cope with in the current situation. Subjects
are as accurate as necessary at the very moment, simply because
of the fact that the subject actively structures the environment.
All oak leaves are similar until one needs the differences. As
subjects interpret while listening to (parts of) sentences, they
put interpretations on them. When some consonants are missing
subjects do not notice their “mistakes” as long as nothing happens
that forces a change of interpretation. Notice that this is a nice
property, because otherwise we could not talk with each other in
a noisy environment.
Completion is not an exclusive language phenomenon. It
occurs for all perceptual activities. For example, we use it
intensively in vision, when we complete occluded parts of objects.
If we couldn’t do that, we would easier loose our bearings in a
crowded environment or a wood.
Dissimilation as a Consequence of Embeddedness
Dissimilation is known in many languages (Alderete and Frisch,
2007), but we restrict ourselves here to dissimilation in Latin. The







The classical analysis is the one proposed by Steriade (1987).
Please recall from section “Structure in language and the magical
number 7-2” the different status of liquid sounds like [r] and
[l] in French and Korean. In French they are phonemes and in
Korean they are allophones. This implies that French speakers
need to memorize the feature [+lateral] for [l] and [–lateral]
for [r] for word pairs such as bal, bar; lire, rire; bourreau,
boulot etc. Korean speakers, on the other hand, do not need
the feature [lateral] at all, given that the occurrence of [l] and
[r] is entirely predictable, which leads to the famous ‘lice/rice’
problem (Cutler, 2012). In Latin, [l] and [r] are phonemes as
well (rex ‘king’ vs. lex ‘law’). Steriade assumes that only sounds
for which the feature [lateral] is relevant are specified for that
feature. For the Latin coronal consonants [t,d,s,n,l,r] the feature
is only relevant for the last two sounds, the group of [CORONAL,
+approximant] sounds (cf. Figure 4 in section “Structure in
language and the magical number 7-2”), and is also the only
feature that contrasts these two sounds. On the assumption that
[t,d,s,n], the group of [CORONAL, -approximant] sounds, are
not specified or unspecified for [lateral] and that this group has a
redundant, surface, [–lateral] specification, Steriade accounts for
the dissimilation effects in (14) as follows. The underlying form
of the suffix is assumed to be -alis as in (14a). In (14b) [l] changes
to [r] if the base contains an [l]. However, if between the [l] in
the base and the [l] in the suffix an [r] intervenes, dissimilation is
blocked, as in (14c). Please observe that although the intervening
[n] and the intervening [t], in lunaris and militaris, are just as [r],
[–lateral], they do not block dissimilation. Steriade’s explanation
for this is that the feature [–lateral] is redundant for the [t,d,s,n]
group, but contrastive for the [r,l] group.
Cser (2010), referring to Dressler (1971) and Hurch (1991),
has claimed that not only an intervening [r] blocks dissimilation,
but that intervening labial and dorsal consonants block
dissimilation as well. Here a word of caution on the data is
in order. The data given in Dressler (1971) go back to von
Paucker (1885) who compiled lists of words with and without
dissimilation, without taking into account the moment in time
the word occurred. So, a form like palmalis is given as a double
form for palmaris ‘of palms.’ The form palmalis does occur
(Library of Latin texts A and B6), but is a hapax as it occurs only
once at around 1050 (Petrus Damiani).
In Table 1 we listed all words with an l in the stem and alis or
aris as a suffix that we found by checking the A and B corpora
of Latin texts on www.brepolis.net (more than 60 million forms)
including all late forms up to the Middle Ages. It shows that
besides an intervening [r], intervening dorsal consonants, [k] and
[g], block dissimilation as well, as illustrated in Table 1A. There
are three exceptions to be noted: culicaris, vulgaris ‘of the mass’
and caligaris, ‘of the boot.’ The form culicaris does not occur in
the A or B corpus, but does occur in the Brepolis database of Latin
dictionaries in four dictionaries, once it is given as culicaris an
adjective ad culices pertinens ‘pertaining to flies,’ but three times
as a noun culiculare ‘mosquito net.’ The form caligaris occurs
nine times in the A corpus, five times before 500 AD and four
times after 500 AD. The form vulgaris is common in A and B
and occurs only once in A as vulgalis (Thomas de Aquino). The
dictionaries give for the last two forms alternative forms with the
same meaning caligarius and vulgarius which might explain the
non-blocking in the related forms caligaris and vulgaris.
We cannot support Cser’s claim that labial consonants, [b],
[m], [p], [f] block the dissimilation as well. There is no blocking in
liminaris ‘of a threshold,’ limitaris ‘of/on the border,’ lupanaris ‘of
a lewd woman,’ lapidaris ‘of stone’ and lupinaris ‘of a lupin seed.’
The apparent exceptions to the general finding that intervening
labials do not block dissimilation, that is words like fulminalis
‘of lightning,’ elementalis ‘elementary,’ (annus) embolismalis ‘year
of 13 lunar months,’ luminalis ‘of light,’ limitalis and palmalis
are all later forms and occur after the 5th centuray AD. We
only found the glide [w] as an instance of a blocking labial
6www.brepolis.net
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TABLE 1 | (A) suffix, alis only; (B) suffix aris only; (C) suffixes alts and aris.
(A)
Blocking interference Words Compiled words
dorsal consonants 7 legalis, glacialis, umbilicalis, intellectualis, vulcanalis, localis,
lecticalis
palatal glide [j] 2 caelestialis, pestilentialis
r 6 floralis, littoralis, lateralis, pluralis, liberalis, larvalis (4 × between
200 and 500 and 17x after 500) = larbalis (4x after 736)
fl or gl 5 fluvialis, flavialis, glebalis, flaminalis con
′
gluvialis
no/in second part 1 sol’stitialis




single l 9 lunaris, solaris, militaris, ridicularis, lupanaris, liminaris, lapidaris,
lupinaris, limitaris
cl 1 Tricliniaris
dorsal: explanation 2 caligaris, culicaris (cali)(gali)s, (culi)(cali)s




10 Before 500 After 500 Reason Before 500 After 500 Reason
latia*is 30 13 / 3 10 palatal glide [j]
linea*is 12 27 / 1 43 palatal glide [j]
proelia*is × / × palatal glide [j]
pluvia*is 1 / 42-n n palatal glide [j]/pl?
elementa*is × / × No explanation/m?
lumina*is 3 44 / 5 no explanation/m?
fulmina*is 3 / 2 lm/m?
palma*is 5 2 / 0 1 lm/m?
cloaca*is 5 / 1 dorsal c
lectua*is 1 / 2 9 dorsal c
* means l or r.
segment. However, the Latin [w] was a labio-dorsal glide, so by
having a dorsal articulator as well, [w] is expected to pattern
with the dorsal consonants in blocking the dissimilation and
one may thus understand the blocking in fluvialis, pluvialis, and
flavialis (Table 1A).
The vowels [e] and [i] became a glide [j] in the 1st
century, which thereby became a consonant (acquiring a
C-place in Clements and Hume, 1995) and which also has
a dorsal articulator, and one may argue that in a similar
way to the glide [w], the later glide [j] in the first three
forms in Table 1C started to block dissimilation (proeliaris,
proelialis, linearis, linealis etc.). There is only one real
exception to the observation that labial consonants do not
block dissimilation and that is the word glebalis ‘of clods.’
The classical form of the word is glaebalis and, again,
given that –ae- [aj] is a vowel-glide sequence, the [j] may
explain the blocking.
Focus theory learns that if in a sequence two non-neighboring
elements are related, the elements in between are grouped or
embedded. So, in GKLGHJ K and L are embedded G(KL)GHJ.
In this representation G(KL)G is a part in itself and so is HJ:
G(KL)G/HJ. If this is not the case and if the sequence has to
be seen as a unity, the better representation is G(KL)G(HJ),
expressing the fact that G is not the end of the first part, but rather
the beginning of the second part. This can be clearly recognized
in longer expressions like G(KL)G(HI)G(JM)GN.
Latin liquid dissimilation can be understood by this property.
We like to concentrate on the question why dissimilation occurs
and what blocking means. The suffix alis creates a problem for
luna, since according to Focus the embedding l(una)l/is occurs,
breaking the word luna and the suffix alis as well. For the same
reason Focus theory learns that the suffix of flora is alis and not
aris since the r in floraris would interfere in a similar way as the
l in lunalis, whereas the common assumption on dissimilation
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assumes that the r in flora blocks the dissimilation. In general,
there must be a clear distinction between the stem and the suffix.
We thus assume that dissimilation only occurs, when due
to interference embedding or grouping takes place that mixes
a part of the stem and a part of the suffix. We found several
reasons while interference does not take place as for example
a dorsal consonant between both l, or the fact that a stem is a
compound word with the l not in the last part7. As mentioned
above, there are two apparent exceptions of the blocking by
dorsal consonants, culicaris and caligaris (see Table 1B). These
are interesting, because in our analysis these are not exceptions
since the interference is not an interference between l but between
more complex sound combinations, possibly including the dorsal
consonants. The combinations culicalis and caligalis are both
impossible, at first sight because of the groupings cu(li)(ca)(li)s
and c(ali)g(ali)s, but more probably because of (culi)(cali)s and
(cali)(gali)s which are groupings when one introduces functions,
(c?li) and (?ali).
We argued that in fluvialis, pluvialis and flavialis (Table 1A),
the glide [w] blocks as well, and that in a similar way glide
[j] blocks in glebalis since it originates from glejbalis. However,
from the viewpoint of interference there might be a different
explanation, holding that the fl en pl (see Tables 1A,C) do not
interfere with a pure l. This could also explain the existence
of congluvialis and flaminalis. Two other apparent exceptions
in Table 1A are compound words since they have no l in the
second word part.
Esbolismalis is an exception that we cannot explain; several
interferences (l, li, lis) are possible. The only explanation is that
lism was pronounced as strong unity. It should also be observed
that it is a late form. In the Library of Latin texts A corpus, it
occurs once before 735 and 74 times after 735. In the course of
ages, after 500 AD, aris became an accepted alternative to alis (see
Table 1C), but not for the cases where interference would occur,
as floraris. Notice, that the revers took place as well; luminaris has
an alternative form luminalis, but just as embolismalis it occurred
after 500 AD, so that it might be an artifact influenced by the
current languages spoken at that time.
The idea is that dissimilation only occurs, when due to
interference embedding takes place that mixes a part of the stem
and a part of the suffix. We will not pursue this issue further
here, but just note that it would be interesting to investigate
dissimilation in other languages from this interference viewpoint.
Consonant Shift
It is typologically quite common to observe in languages that in
an intervocalic position consonants tend to weaken. Voiceless
consonants become pronounced as voiced, a modification known
as VOICING and voiced plosive consonants become pronounced
as voiced fricative ones, generally termed SPIRANTIZATION.
In Table 2 we give some relevant examples from Sisco Corsican
(Cravens, 2000; Gurevich, 2004) and from Gran Canarian
Spanish (Oftedal, 1985). In Table 2A for example, the voiced
7Although we did not found it in Latin, it is understandable that a rhythm in the
pronunciation can avoid dissimilation by breaking the stem into parts or disjoining
the stem and the suffix.
plosives are realized as voiced fricatives and the voiceless plosives
as voiced plosives when occurring in intervocalic position.
The interaction between VOICING and SPIRANTIZATION
that can be observed in Table 2 is extremely hard to describe
and to explain by current phonological theory. There have
been two main ways of describing the relation between stored,
underlying forms of words in the mental lexicon and their
concrete realization in speech. The Corsican words for ‘bread,’
‘time’ and ‘dog’ in (2a) are commonly assumed to be stored
in memory with an initial [p], [t], and [k]. Their surface
realization after a vowel as [b], [d], and [g] is assumed to
be the result of a phonological modification that takes place
when a speakers picks up words from memory and combines
them into sentences. The dominant first view in generative
phonology is to consider these modifications as a series of
ordered rules. The way in which the two rules of VOICING
and SPIRANTIZATION have to be ordered for the data in (2)
is in such a way that VOICING applies first, so that it is no
longer applicable after SPIRANTIZATION has been applied. This
order, however, is considered a problematic one, given that it is
not clear why, if there is VOICING, VOICING does not also
affect the outcome of SPIRANTIZATION. The assumption (Hale
and Reiss, 2008) is that this order should be the dispreferred
one in languages. However, Gurevich (2004) has shown for 230
voicing and spirantization processes in 153 languages that in
the majority (92%) of cases, this is, contrary to expectation,
exactly the order that one finds. For the second dominant view
in generative phonology, Optimality Theory, the data in (2) are
even more problematic. The assumption of Optimality Theory
is that stored words are evaluated with respect to a number of
output well-formedness conditions, one of which would say that a
voiced consonant in intervocalic position should be pronounced
as a fricative. Although this accounts for the modification of
the initial [b], [d], and [g] cases in (2a; 4–6) it fails for the
initial [p], [t] and [k] in (2a; 1–3). Why is there still a surface
intervocalic [b], [d], [g], if there is a well-formedness condition
requiring that they should be pronounced as fricatives? We refer
for further critical discussions of various proposals that have been
put forward within the constrained-based framework to Jacobs
(2019).
What the rule-based and the constraint-based models share
is that they both are speaker-oriented, that is, they model the
connection between the stored, underlying word form, say la
gama, and the actual pronunciation of that word by a speaker,
[la7ama], without looking at the perception-side, where the
listener has to interpret the heard form, say [la7ama], as being
the stored, underlying word form, la gama.
We think that Focus-theory also might provide a new way
of looking at phonological modifications that have proven
to be problematic for these production-based models, which
are processing models. Focus-theory states that not processes,
but representations are the key; these are dictated by Focus.
We will explain the phenomena on the basis of “the other
side of the coin,” which means not on the maximum length
of expressions but on the existence of two complementary
representations in Focus. The research question then is what do
these representations look like.
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TABLE 2 | Examples of consonant shifts.
(A) Corsican voicing of voiceless consonants
voiceless voiced
1 [p] [pane] ‘bread’ [b] [ubane] ‘the bread’
2 [t] [tεmpu] ‘time’ [d] [udεmpu] ‘the time’
3 [k];kane] ‘dog’ [g] [ugane] ‘the dog’
Corsican spirantization of voiced plosive consonants
Voiced plosive voiced fricative
4 [b] [bok:a] ‘mouth’ [β] [aβok:a] ‘the mouth’
5 [d] [dεntu] ‘tooth’ [ð] [uðεnte] ‘the tooth’
6 [g] [gola] ‘throat’ [γ] [aγola] ‘the throat’
(B) Canarian Spanish Canarian Spanish
Voicing of voiceless consonants
Voiced Voiceless Voiced Voiceless
1 [g] [tibigo] [k] tipico ‘typical’ [b] [unabluma] [p] [una pluma] ‘a feather’
2 [d] [frudero] [t] frutero ‘fruit bowl’ [d] [unadjenda] [t] [una tienda] ‘a shop’
3 [g] [musiga] [k] musica ‘music’ [g] [lagama] [!k] [la cama] ‘the bed’
4 [ ] [fle a] [ ] flecha ‘arrow’ [ ] [una iga] [ ] [una chica] ‘a girl’
Spirantization of voiced plosive consonants
5 [ð] [naða] [ð] nada ‘nothing’ [ð] laðoma] [ð] la doma ‘the taming’
6 [β] [roβa] [β] roba ‘steals’ [β] [laβaxa] [β] la baja ‘the
7 [γ] [plaγa] [γ] Plaga ‘plague’ [γ] [laγama] [γ] la gama ‘the range’
(C) Surface contrasts in Gran Canarian Spanish
Canarian Spanish Canarian Spanish
1 [d] [nada] [t] nata ‘cream’ [ð] [naða] [ð] nada ‘nothing’
2 [b] [roba] [p] ropa ‘clothes’ [βl [roβa] [β] roba ‘steals’
3 [g] [plaga] [k] placa ‘plate’ [γ] [plaγa] [γ] Plaga ‘plague’
The consonants [k] and [g] have the same features except
that the voice feature of [k] is negative (–V, voiceless) and the
voice feature of [g] is positive (+V, voiced). In a similar way [g]
and [7] only have a different continuant; [g] has a negative or
plosive (–C) feature and [7] has a positive, fricative or continuous
(+C) feature. Figure 10 shows in each circle mostly pairs of
consonants. Each pair either agrees on the V feature and differs
on the C feature or agrees on the C feature and differs on the V
feature. For each pair, all other features are equal, which means
that the members of a pair are produced in the same way except
for the V or the C feature. In the overlaps between the circles one
sees the consonants with both the V and the C specified. The way
of presentation in Figure 10 is not arbitrarily chosen. We think
that it will be helpful to explain how, according to Focus-theory,
the consonants may be represented in the cognitive brain.
We assume that not the specific consonant is stored in
memory, but rather the representations of the features for its
pronunciation, which trigger the sensorimotor control of the
pronunciation. The consonants in a trio like [k], [g], [7] have
a lot of features in common. Since all features for these three
consonants are the same except V or C, we concentrate on these
two. [k], [g], [7] only differ in a combination of them: plosive (–
C) or fricative (+C) and voiced (+V) or voiceless (–V). So, [k]
has the features [–C–V], [g] [–C+V], [7] [+C+V] and we can
add to these [x] [+C–V]. Assuming that not the pronunciation
itself is stored, but the representations that trigger the moving
forces behind, we find that –C implies [k] and [g], +C implies
[7] and [x], +V implies [g] and [7], and –V implies [k] and [x].
Notice that in –C, the V feature is not fixed, or in other words,
the –C representation of [k] or [g] is ambiguous with respect to
V. This holds equally for +V (ambiguous with respect to C), +C
and –V. The representations –C and +C on the one side and –V
and +V on the other are complementary to each other. This can
also be read in Figure 10 in the sense that one finds [k], [g], [7],
and [x] in the intersections of C and V.
(5d) Ik ga [Ig7a] ‘I go’ Ik vind [IgvInt] ‘I find’
Ik zit [IgzIt] ‘I sit’
Whether a –C consonant will become [k] or [g] depends on
the context. In accordance with section “Structure in language
and the magical number 7-2” (Figure 4) shifts can only take place
within one representation. To elucidate: in the+C representation
the V can move between +V ([7]) and –V ([x]) but cannot
between –C and +C since +C is fixed. This explains why [k] can
shift to [g], [g] can shift to [7], but there is no shift from [k] to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 18 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 649384
fpsyg-12-649384 June 16, 2021 Time: 16:16 # 19
Buffart and Jacobs Structure in Language
FIGURE 10 | Representations of consonants. The circles refer to representations, their intersections to the physical utterances.
[7], and vice versa8, which is precisely what Sisco Corsican and
Gran Canarian Spanish show in Table 2. In a –V context, as for
example in [kane] (A3), the pronunciation will be as a [k] and
in a +V context, as in [ugane] it will be as a [g]. This similarly
holds for+V, where the pronunciation will be [g] in a –C context,
as in [gola] (A6) and a [7] in a +C context, as in [a7ola]. Here
the silence before a word is a [–V–C] environment and a vowel
is a [+V+C] environment. The other consonants in Figure 10
behave in a similar way, such as for instance the trio [p], [b], [β],
as in [roba], ropa, [roβa] and roba (C2), and the trio [t], [d], [ð],
as in [nada], nata, [naða] and nada (C1). Other examples of shifts
allowed by the model are [pane] and [ubane] (A1), [tεmpu] and
[udεmpu] (A2), and [baxa] and [laβaxa] (B6).
We will also use this model to explain the shifts in (5).
So, we assume that for each consonant in a word one of the
features is determined, either the C feature or the V feature.
The other feature is determined by the context during the
utterance. Moreover, in Dutch the ending consonant of a word
is ambiguous with respect to voice. This means that during
speech production and perception voice or no-voice is easily
influenced by the context.
8Surely k can change into 7 over a long period, but only if k changes into g
and the status of this consonant changes from a –C representation into a +V
representation. This is a different and historical process (cf. Jacobs, 2019).
(5c) Ik denk [Igdεnk] ‘I think’ Ik bid [IgbIt] ‘I pray’
So, the k in Ik in (5c) has a –C feature and is ambiguous
with respect to V, and the d and b in denk and bid in (5c) have
a +V feature and are ambiguous with respect to C. Therefore,
the only adaptation possible is that [k] becomes +V, which
means [g]. In short, [–C–V]/[–C+V]→ [–C+V]/[–C+V]. This
regressive assimilation often occurs in French since many words
begin with a +V feature fixed; for example, the order vowel-p-v-
vowel becomes in French vowel-b-v-vowel but in Dutch vowel-p-
f-vowel, a progressive assimilation due to the –V property of the
consonant at the end of a word.
The k in Ik in (5b) has a –C feature and is ambiguous with
respect to V, and the g, v and z in ga, vind en zit in (5b) have a+C
feature and are ambiguous with respect to V.
(5b) Ik ga [Ikxa] ‘I go’ Ik vind [IkfInt] ‘I find’
Ik zit [IksIt] ‘I sit’
Our model delivers two solutions. First, the progressive
voice assimilation showed in (5b). Here the second consonant
changed from [7], [v] and [z] into [x], [f] and [s]. In short,
[–C–V]/[+C+V] → [–C–V]/[+C–V]. The second solution
is an adaptation from [k] in Ik to [g] as shown in (5d).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 19 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 649384
fpsyg-12-649384 June 16, 2021 Time: 16:16 # 20
Buffart and Jacobs Structure in Language
In short, [–C–V]/[+C+V] → [–C+V]/[+C+V], a regressive
voice assimilation.
Some 6% of the Dutchmen, living in the south of the Province
Limburg, prefer the second solution (5d). It might be tempting to
try and explain why Limburgian Dutch and French would have a
preference for regressive rather than progressive assimilation. It
could be related to the frequency of occurrence of phonemically
contrastive voiced and voiceless fricatives, rather limited in
Standard Dutch, rather absent in Randstad Dutch, less so in
Limburgian Dutch and frequent in French. Alternatively, melody
and tone might play a role. We will not venture a further
explanation here.
The study of Gurevich (2004), mentioned above, suggests
that the model represented in Figure 10 may cover 92% of
the investigated languages in her corpus. The model completely
fits with the main theorem of Focus-theory, which implies a
maximum of two representations in Focus. Since Focus governs
the communication with the environment, this model holds for
production and for perception as well. The latter is in line with
the assumption that the human system is an active system that
always operates on the environment. The model explains which
shifts are possible. Shifts between [k] and [g] are allowed, when
the consonant in the word is memorized as –C, whereas shifts
between [g] and [7] are allowed, when a consonant is memorized
as+V. The model represented in Figure 10 obviously only holds
for languages where the differences between consonants are based
on the properties fricative/plosive and voiced/voiceless, that is on
the features ‘continuant’ and ‘voice.’ If that is not the case, as
for instance in Korean, which does not have a phonemic +V/–
V difference, shifts do not occur, or other shifts may take place.
However, the prediction is that whatever the model for a given
language will be, it will always be based on two complementary
representations.
In Dutch [v], [z], [7] form the [+V+C] group and [b], [d] the
[+V–C] group. The [–V+C] and [–V–C] groups are [f], [s], [x],
and [p], [t] respectively. In Dutch the consonant at the end of a
word is –V, so the model in Figure 10 may help to understand the
pronunciation of some verbs in section “Where does structure
come from?” that are voiced in their plural form but voiceless in
their singular form like wij geven and ik geef, wij lezen and ik lees,
wij zeggen and ik zeg, wij hebben and ik heb and wij wedden and
ik wed. The pronunciation shifts are from [+V+C] to [–V+C]:
geven [v] → [f] geef, lezen [z]→ [s] lees, zeggen [7] → [x] zeg
and from [+V–C] to [–V–C]: hebben [b] → [p] heb, wedden
[d] → [t] wed. In (15b) one can see that in hebben, the first
person singular form shows regressive voice assimilation. In
section “Where does structure come from?” we also showed that
there are verbs that are voiceless in both plural and singular form,
as kopen and wensen. These verbs also show in the first person
singular regressive assimilation to voiced as shown in (15b) and
(15e). The voiceless pronunciation at the end of Dutch words is
shown in (15a) and (15d). This also occurs in (15c) and (15f)
since the following word starts with a voiceless consonant.
DISCUSSION
The theory used here is a theory on cognition that rests on three
principles: first, the human cognitive system is an active system
that focuses, which means: it does not processes information but
it creates the information in interaction with its surroundings;
second, this interaction is based on sequences; and third in
a representation different types of relations between elements
do not interfere. The consequence is the connection between
5 up to 7 elements in Focus and the use of maximally two
complementary representations in Focus. These are two sides of
the same coin. This mathematical result convinced us that the
overwhelming occurrence of 7-2 in psychology and language is
not a pernicious Pythagorean coincidence, but a characteristic
feature of human cognition.
Focus is the intermediary between Memory and the
surroundings. This surroundings is fluid. It is not only outside
the body, but can also be thoughts, images, concepts, percepts
et cetera, or in other words, each content in the brain. Focus
structures9 the surroundings, which is only possible if Focus relies
on a general brain property. Therefore Buffart (2017) suggested
that cross frequency couplings of local brain rhythms may
determine Focus and that global couplings may determine the
activation level of the other cognitive operations, like Memory,
and for that reason, preference and attention. This implies that
local rhythms determine the structure and that global ones
between brain regions determine the strength of the relations
between these structures. The latter system requires a broadly
branched network since it combines relations to all senses and
the effectors of the body. If the suggestion is correct individual
differences in Focus-capacity could also be found by differences
in cross frequency couplings of local brain rhythms.
Davis and Holmes (2005) reported on experiments in which
they showed that the number of objects in a visual short-term
memory (VSTM) experiment is not a fixed number of 4 contrary
to what Luck and Vogel (1997) have claimed. Davis and Holmes
constructed stimuli with four clusters of visual objects, each
having a colored small left and right part and a white circle or
oval in between. When the left and right parts attach the circle or
oval, they are together seen as one single object, partly occluded
9Notice, that (re)structuring the content of the brain may lead to what we call
creativity in common parlance.
(15a) [p] ik he[p] ik koo[p] [–C–V]
(15b) [b] ik he[b] [d]adels ik koo[b] [d]adels [–C–V]/[–C+V]→ [–C+V]/[–C+V]
(15c) [p] ik he[p] [[t]afels ik koo[p] [t]afels [–C–V]/[–C–V]
(15d) [s] ik wen[s] [+C–V]
(15e) [z] ik wen[z] [d]adels [+C–V]/[–C+V]→ [+C+V]/[–C+V]
(15f) [s] ik wen[s] [t]afels [+C–V]/[–C–V]
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by the circle or oval. When they do not attach, both parts are
perceived as two objects. In relation to Focus, the fifth experiment
that Davis and Holmes reported on, is the most interesting. Here,
the left part is the mirror image of the right part. The difference
between the results of this experiment and those of the other
experiments can only be understood, if one assumes that subjects
have noticed the symmetry.
Since according to Focus theory, form detection occurs
within Focus, processing in Focus must take place before, or
simultaneously with, STM processing. Let us therefore have a
closer look at one of the experiments described in Cowan (2000).
Subjects hear numbers, while they search on a computer for
words in four surrounding fields that rhyme with a word in the
central field. After some time, the inputs stop and subjects have
to recall the numbers in the right reversed order, beginning with
the last one. The error rate is measured, showing a mean low
rate between 2.5 and 3.5 numbers and a low rate for individual
differences between 2 and 6.
When the numbers pass Focus, chunking is necessary to
handle the stream of numbers. Let C5 mean a chunk of span
5. Then for Focus span 7, one can represent the row by the
chunks C5C2 and its complementary representation C4C310.
Both together cover the row. In symbols (ABCDE)(FG) and
(ABCD)(EFG), where A refers to the last number11. For Focus
span 7, C5 and C4 are the relevant chunks, for span 6, C4 and
C3, and, for span 5, C3 and C2. Since there is no preference for
one of the representations, the mean chunk lengths are 4.5, 3.5,
and 2.5 respectively, and individual differences may vary between
2 and 5, both in line with the findings of Cowan (2000). So,
Focus theory is in line with the experimental results, but the
interpretation is different given that Focus does not use a limited
memory concept. The suggestion of a limited memory comes
from the fact that unrelated elements pass Focus, which has a
limited capacity and builds chunks in order to cope with them.
Focus “catches” the input, using maximally two representations,
each obeying the non-interference between both types of possible
relations between its elements.
Given that in perception, the outcome of Focus is determined
by a combination of input from the sensory register and from
long-term memory the question arises, whether there is a relation
with the concept of working memory (WM). Focus does not
describe any processing as WM does (Baddeley, 2000). If,
according to Baddeley, WM is an LTM-independent mechanism,
there might be a relation between Focus and WM, and Focus
would describe the structure of the results of its processes. If
not, WM is part of Memory. Focus and Memory are distinct
cognitive functions. Processing occurs in Memory, and, as far as
this theory is concerned, is restricted to preference. As Baddeley
et al. (2019) admit the question whether the processes assigned
to WM could be part of the long-term system, is still an open
one. However, that may be, Focus plays a role in the intermediate
stage between memory and sensory and equilibrium organs, but
also plays a role in thinking, when one thought is related to
10C2C5 and C3C4 are complementary representations as well, but with regard to
the point to be made here, that does not alter the argumentation.
11Notice that C2 and C3 refer to complex structures, if a subject would try to retain
numbers heard before.
another one, and in production as well, when subjects respond
or produce other utterances. The restrictions come from Focus,
not from Memory.
From this it is clear, that there is some relation between Focus
and Attention, but these concepts are not identical. They rest on
different theoretical premisses. Attention, and in the same way
Working Memory, are concepts in the tradition of information
processing. The information comes from the environment,
feelings and thoughts of the subject. Focus theory takes the
subject as an active system, for which a hypothesis testing
system could be used as a metaphor. Marchetti (2014) regards
episodic memory and episodic future as constructive processes.
He states “Regarding the construction processes underpinning
the various forms of consciousness, we have seen that the basic
elements are provided by attention, and that their assembly is
ensured by working memory.” Oberauer (2019) discussed control
mechanisms in the interaction between Working Memory (WM)
and Attention and concluded that “WM plays a crucial role in
controlling attention and action by holding the representations
that guide attention and action. The control process consists
of selecting these representations into WM – once they are
established in WM, they have their influence on attention and
action automatically . . .”. These two views are very close to the
basic concepts of the Focus mechanism. Focus theory supposes
that representations which make up the hypothesis of the current
environment/surroundings (cf. fn. 5) are more activated and thus,
one could say, embody a “temporal working memory.” The most
activated representation and in most cases a complementary one
appear in Focus. If (a part of) the Focus content does not fit with
the environment/surroundings, new representations appear by
a change of the activation field. Although Focus and Attention
are different concepts, the most activated representation in Focus
can be seen as the “focus of attention” (Oberauer, 2019). Notice
that, in the information processing model, a top down controlling
mechanism for Attention has been introduced, whereas in Focus
this controlling mechanism is implicit.
Although Focus and Memory are distinct cognitive functions,
the differences in Focus-capacity lead to differences in Memory.
There are 16 possible representations for Focus-capacity 5,
43 for Focus-capacity 6 and 163 for Focus-capacity 7. Most
representations could be associated with more than one pair
of complementary representations. Therefore, the number of
potential and actual associations in Memory rapidly increases
with Focus-capacity, which in turn leads to richer memory
networks12. In general, it is hard to show directly that structures
in Focus determine the associations in Memory. But experiments
with serial patterns showed (van Leeuwen et al., 1988; van der
Vegt et al., 1989; van Leeuwen and Buffart, 1989) that the idea
that structural interpretations of stimuli govern the network
structures in memory (Buffart, 1986) makes sense. Serial patterns
were memorized, for instance, in terms of their structural
components, and associations between them were based on
complementarity between their representations. Although Focus
12A maximum of span 7 is a smart choice of biology. A span of 8 or more
would explode the possible solutions and sometimes require 3 instead of 2
complementary representations at the same time. It could lead to uncertainty and
overload.
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operates sequentially, the finite number of possible sequence
structures guarantees that the processing of the system is
fast. With respect to this the findings of Elliott and Giersch
(2016) are interesting. These show that in a “psychological
moment” of at most 50–60 ms the elements are processed
successively. Moreover, assuming that a basic processing unit
takes 4.5 ms (Geißler, 2018) for Focus-capacity 7, one could
roughly say that for an experienced reader a linear sentence as
(3) “Nous avons appris le français grâce à nos enseignants” would
roughly take 1.5 s, being 7∗4.5 ms (≈31.5 ms) for a syllable,
7∗7∗4.5 ms (≈ 220 ms) for the phonological phrase and 7∗7∗7∗4.5
for the sentence.
The theory presupposes that Focus processes sequences. This
means that each communication between the mind and its
surroundings is sequential in principle. But theories which
advocate hierarchy in human communication have a point as
well. Due to the Focus limitations every expression and every
percept have at the surface level a limited number of elements
that are processed at once. But these elements are mostly very
complex expressions themselves or in the case of language often
“refer to” complex objects or situations. In languages one easily
recognizes this hierarchy, as for example, in subordinate clauses,
a grouping of adjectives and a noun, and the limited number of
distinct elements in sentence parsing.
Focus forces hierarchy, but it does not prescribe which
structure is preferred. It only learns that within one
representation differing relations between elements exclude
each other, and that there are maximal two representations to
compose an expression for production or perception. Some
researchers suppose that humans have a special inborn ability
for language grammar or for its building blocks. There is no
need for such an assumption since the limitations of Focus force
hierarchical constructs and, on the other hand, set restrictions to
the depth of these constructs.
The Focus limitations not only generate hierarchy in language,
they also generate the perception of visual form and meter
in music as shown in the work of the Structural Information
Group in Nijmegen (Leeuwenberg, 1971; Collard et al., 1981;
Buffart and Leeuwenberg, 1983; Leeuwenberg and van der Helm,
2015) and they appeared to be applicable to explain reaction
times in verification and classification tasks of objects according
conceptual categories (Buffart and Geißler, 1984; Geißler and
Buffart, 1985). All experienced structure is generated by Focus.
For sure, pre-structured input will be helpful to detect structure,
but this does not mean that experienced structure is only
usage-based as, for example, Bod (2002) assumes. When several
structures are possible, usage may influence the preference
for some structures above others, but not structures as such.
According to Buffart (2017) preference is not a Focus issue. Focus
does not determine the preference for some language expressions
above others or for some interpretations of visual objects above
others. Focus governs structure, but preference is governed by
Memory. Intelligence and creativity are based on Focus not on
Memory. This implies that the nature of human intelligence
fundamentally differs from computer intelligence.
Memory is a type of neural network or connectionist model. It
is a network of representations, that is based on relations between
their elements. The more activated relations a set of elements has,
the stronger it is. In principle the more preferred representation
is the representation with more and stronger activated relations.
This depends on
• the internal structure of a representation composed of type
A and type B relations. Without any context or memory
influence, one can predict which representations will be
preferred. A representation with more structure has less
degrees of freedom, which is known as the minimum
principle, and is therefore stronger activated in isolation.
In visual perception research, it is easier than in language
experiments, to present stimuli without context and thus in
isolation, and indeed, then the predictions on preference are
impressive (Leeuwenberg and Buffart, 1983). In language
experiments context and memory always will play a role.
• the context, which might be context within the message
itself or from the circumstances as, for example, a preceding
question or discussion, or even an experimental task
(Buffart et al., 1981).
• memory. It influences the syntactical correctness of
sentences. As far as it is not a consequence of Focus,
correctness is usage-based. Although the order of the
elements in a Focus representation is free, a word sequence,
in which the words that are directly related to each other
are neighbors, will have representations with more relations
than sequences, in which they are not neighbors. In this
sense the interaction between preference and Focus directly
influences order. Notice that due to the general activity
principle of the theory, Memory is an always active network
and that the more activated representation and its more
activated complement are the representations that are
active in Focus. In consequence of memory influence, they
are not necessarily the representations with less degrees of
freedom in isolation.
For research it is nice when one could present stimuli in
splendid isolation, since then representations are characterized
by the minimal degrees of freedom, which generally in daily
life do not occur. We emphasize that this minimum is not a
process criterium as Chater (1996) and Bod (2002) suppose.
Focus-theory is not a process theory. On the contrary, it
tells that one first must understand structure (Focus) in
order to be able to understand processing (Memory). For
sure, there is interaction between structure and processing
in the sense that the most preferred structures in Memory
determine the Focus representations and that the representation
in Focus induces Memory activity. The outcomes are preferred
representations. In the interaction with the environment one
might better consider it as stability, which includes not
only the influence of context and memory as is almost
always the case in language but also the extent of the
analyses of the environment as far as momentarily necessary
for the subject.
An active cognitive system implies that perception is silent
production. Language perception and production are active
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processes which generate structure. The fact that this structure
is often similar for many languages does not imply that this
has to be attributed to a genetical blueprint, but rather to
the overall working of the active brain. Some research directly
supports the idea of an active brain. Bolton (1894) showed that
physically identical sounds made by an electronic metronome are
nevertheless perceived by listeners as auditory grouped. Iversen
et al. (2008) report that Japanese and English participants showed
different patterns of perceptual grouping of sequences of tones
in which every second tone had either increased amplitude or
increased duration relative to the first tone. These differences are
attributed to different native language influence. Other support
for the notion of an active brain is presented by neurologists (De
Ridder et al., 2015) to explain tinnitus and other disorders.
For us the more defiant research question is to show that
one can apply the general Focus-theory to explain a variety of
language phenomena, knowing that the theory has already been
applied successfully to visual form perception. In other words,
did we find a more general approach to structural aspects of
cognition? The theory does not only describe how languages
and phonology behave, but much more why they do so. Some
phenomena are of general nature as the tension between the
sequential and the hierarchical character of language. It, however,
can also account for the perceptual limits on the number of
embedded sentences. It makes clear why the number 5 so often
turns up in language and phonetics research. We used the other
side of the coin, two complementary representations, to build
a model explaining the properties of consonant shifts. This
notion of complementary representations opens possibilities for
research. Imagine, for example, that there is a representation
of the elements of the message and a representation of the
modus of the message. In this way one might understand the
difference between “John falls in love with Mary” and “Falls
John in love with Mary?”. In the latter sentence the question
mode is expressed by the inversed order of the subject and
the verb. That is not always the case. The question mode
can also be expressed by the intonation or music of the
sentence (“John falls in love with Mary?”). There is a big
research challenge to look at language phenomena from such a
complementarity viewpoint.
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